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SELF-INCRIMINATION
The Hall court stated that had the issue been preserved, it
would have held that a defense witness's right to assert his Fifth
Amendment protection against self incrimination does not
interfere with the prosecution's right to cross examination
because remedial measures are available as discussed above.'
The jury instructions given by the Hall court providing that the
jury was permitted to consider the witness's refusal to testify to
affect only his credibility, allowed the jury the benefit of drawing
inferences while at the same time protecting the witness against
self incrimination. The court's interpretation is that a witness's
right to invoke his privilege of silence was not diminished by the
court's instruction allowing the jury to consider the silence as
affecting the witness's credibility."' This instruction was the
least harmful remedial measure that the court could impose on
defendant. 150
SUPREME COURT
BRONX COUNTY
Seabrook v. Johnson
(decided May 5, 1997)
During 1996, five corrections officers were indicted for the
falsification of business records in the first degree, "offering a
false instrument for filing in the first degree," and "assault in the
third degree." 2 Petitioner, Norman Seabrook, President of the
Correction Officers' Benevolent Association, is the collective
bargaining representative for about 10,000 New York City
148 People v. Hall, 236 A.D.2d at 789-90, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 491-93 (4th
Dep't 1997).
149 Siegel, 87 N.Y. 2d at 545, 663 N.E.2d 876, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 835.
150 Id. at 544, 663 N.E.2d 875, 640 N.Y.S.2d at 834 (citing People v. Chin,
67 N.Y.2d 22, 28, 490 N.E.2d 505 (1986)).
... 173 Misc. 2d 15, 660 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1997).
'5 Id at 16, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 314. Note, Henry Neil was indicted for
falsiPfyg business records and "offering a false instrument," but he was not
indicted for charges of assault. Id.
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Correction Officers.' 53 Petitioners assert that they are immune
from prosecution and claim a violation of their right against
compelled self-incrimination pursuant to the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments of the Federal Constitution1m and Article I, section 6
of the New York State Constitution.'55
Petitioners seek to prohibit the Bronx County District
Attorney, Robert T. Johnson, from engaging in further
prosecutorial proceedings.156 Petitioners' indictments stem from a
departmental investigation conducted by the Department of
Corrections into the alleged misconduct by the five correctional
officers. 157 Petitioners contend that under threat of losing their
jobs, they were each ordered to submit a "Use of Force Report"
which is required pursuant to the departmental rules and
regulations. 158 Furthermore, each petitioner alleged that he did
not believe the report could be used against him as evidence in a
related criminal investigation.'59
Petitioners contended that they answered questions at a
deposition by the Federal Bureau of Investigation under the belief
that if they did not answer they would be terminated from their
employment.' 60 Although immunization is automatic for public
employees under both the Federal and State Constitutions when a
statement is made under threat of dismissal, respondents
successfully cross-moved to dismiss the petition asserting that the
petitioners failed to show "a clear legal wrong" in accordance
153 Id.
154 U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent
part: "No person shall be... compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself." Id. See also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides in pertinent part: "No state shall enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States". Id.
155 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Article I, Section 6 provides: "nor shall he be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself..." Id.
156 Seabrook, 173 Misc. 2d at 16, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
'5 Id. at 16-17, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 314
158 Id. at 16-20, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 314-16.
159 Id.
160 Id.
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with CPLR 7804(f)."' The court agreed with respondents as it
suggested that the petitioners "failed to establish a clear legal
right, either in fact or law, for such extraordinary relief
requested. -"2
While petitioner's contended that they completed the "Use of
Force Report" in response to the threat of job forfeiture, the
court held that the purpose of the report was not to incriminate
the officer, but, in part, was to protect the officers and the
department.'6 Furthermore, the court stated that "the mere
possibility of incrimination is insufficient to defeat the strong
policies in favor of disclosure in instances where force is
used." 16 4
In California v. Byers,1 defendant, allegedly involved in an
automobile accident and did not stop to identify himself in
accordance with the California State statute.66 Defendant argued
that requiring him to stop "violated his privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination."'67 The United States Supreme
Court, however, held that automobile accidents do not rise to the
level of a "substantial risk of self-incrimination."" In this
regard, the Supreme Court gave deference to the state police
power to regulate the use of automobiles. 69
161 Id at 18, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 315. See Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70
(1973); Matt v. Larocca, 71 N.Y.2d 154, 159, 518 N.E.2d 1172, 1174, 524,
N.Y.S.2d 180, 182 (1987). N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7904 (f) (McKinney 1994). The
statute provides in pertinent part: "among defenses that the court has explicitly
denominated objections in point of law include failure to state a cause of
action, lack of standing, lack of finality, failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, statute of limitations, failure to join a necessary party and lack of
jurisdiction." Id
6 Seabrook, 173 Misc. 2d at 19, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
163 Id. at 19-20, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
164Id.
165 402 U.S. 424 (1970).
166 Id. at 426.
167 Id.
16 Id. at 431.
169Id. at 432.
1998 1259
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Comparatively, in People v. Samuel,'70 defendant alleged he
was protected against self incrimination when he allegedly
violated a New York Statute by leaving the scene of an
accident. 171 The New York Court of Appeals held that "the risk
of inculpation by identification" when reporting a motor vehicle
accident is limited and incidental; the statute should not be
inhibited by the privilege of self-incrimination.172 The New York
Court of Appeals also recognized that there must exist a balance
between social and individual interests.173
The Johnson court drew a distinction between self-reporting
requirements between activities which are lawful and those that
are unlawful.' Similarly, in United States v. Sullivan,73
defendant failed to properly file his tax return as required by the
statute.176  Since defendant was involved in the unlawful
trafficking of liquor, he asserted that he was protected by the
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution from
reporting this information as such a statement would violate his
right against self-incrimination.1 7  The court, however, found
that in this instance the protection of the Fifth Amendment was
"pressed too far" and "it would be an extreme if not an
extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that if
authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income
because it had been made in crime." 171
In People v. Patterson,'7 defendant, a probationary officer,
"had failed to report the discharge of her police issued
firearm." 180 Defendant contended that the privilege against self-
incrimination protected her from reporting the fact that she
170 29 N.Y.2d 252, 277 N.E.2d 381, 327 N.Y.S.2d 321 (1971).
I'l 29 N.Y.2d at 256, 277 N.E.2d at 382, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 323.
Id. at. 257, 277 N.E.2d at 313, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
" Id at 258, 277 N.E.2d at 384, 327 N.Y.S.2d at 324.
174 Seabrook, 173 Misc. 2d at 21, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
'75 256 U.S. 259 (1927).
176 Id. at 263.
in id
171 Id at 263-64.
179 169 Misc. 2d 787, 646 N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1996).
"0 Id. at 789, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
1260 [Vol 14
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discharged her firearm. ' Consistent with the holding in
Seabrook v. Johnson," the Patterson court held that the police
department regulation to report the discharge of a firearm does
not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
because the regulation is lawful and its purpose is not to
incriminate.183
In Seabrook v. Johnson,' the court also addressed the
petitioners' contention that the representatives of the Federal
Bureau of Investigations led them to believe that if they did not
answer questions, they would be terminated from their jobs.'8
The court did not decide this issue because the court explained,
petitioners can have an adequate remedy within their respective
pending criminal cases.""
In sum, there exists common interpretations of the Federal
Constitution and New York Constitutions with regard to the
privilege against self-incrimination. As discussed in Seabrook v.
Johnson,""7 both federal and New York State courts look to the
lawfulness or the unlawfulness of the activity. In Seabrook, the
purpose of the report was not only a legal activity, but it was also
intended to protect the individual officers.' By the same token,
if the purpose of the report was to incriminate the officers who
had committed unlawful acts, then, arguably, the report would
have been found to violate the officer's rights against self
incrimination. 89 In this instance, however, the fact the report
served to incriminate the officers was merely "incidental" to the
intended use of the form. 19° If necessary, as illustrated Sullivan, a
court will implement judicial discretion in determining the weight
181 Id at 788, 646 N.Y.S.2d at 763.
182 660 N.Y.S.2d 311, 316, 173 Misc. 2d 15, 21-22 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County
1997).183Patterson, 169 Misc. 2d at 793, 646 N.Y.S. 2d at 766.
18 173 Misc. 2d 15, 660 N.Y.S.2d 311 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1997).
1 1d. at 20, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
186Id.
187 Id.
18 Id. at 20, 660 N.Y.S.2d at 316.
189Id.19D id.
1998 1261
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of the social interest against the weight of the individual
interest. 9 ' Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Byers pointed out
that, in some cases, the courts may give deference to the
legislature where a state is using its police powers to regulate a
legitimate state interest.19
SUPREME COURT
SUFFOLK COUNTY
People v. Shulman'93
(printed December 4, 1997)
Defendant Shulman was accused of a single count of first
degree murder, along with four counts of murder in the second
degree."4 The State had indicated that they would pursue a death
penalty sentence upon conviction. 95 Defendant submitted several
motions seeking to invalidate and declare as unconstitutional
section 400.27 (14)(a)(ii), section 220.10 (5)(e), section 220.30
(3)(b)(vii), and section 220.60 (2) of the New York State
Criminal Procedure Law [hereinafter "CPL"].196 The first stated
191 Sullivan, 274 U.S. at 260.
'
92Byers, 402 U.S. at 432.
193 N.Y. L.J., Dec. 4, 1997, 35 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County).
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (14)(a)(ii) provides that:
The defendant shall, unless previously disclosed and subject
to a protective order, make available to the prosecution the
statements and information specified in subdivision two of
section 240.45 and make available for inspection,
photographing copying or testing, subject to constitutional
limitations, the reports, documents, and other property
specified in subdivision one of section 240.30.
Id. N. Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.10(5) (e) provides that:
A defendant may not enter a plea of guilty to the crime of
murder in the first degree as defined in section 125.27 of the
penal law; provided, however, that a defendant may enter
[Vol 141262
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